UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-5-2017

Jones v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44529

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Jones v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44529" (2017). Not Reported. 3601.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3601

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LESTER LAURAL JONES,

)
)
No. 44529
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
Madison Co. Case No.
vs.
)
CV-2015-92
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MADISON
________________________
HONORABLE GREGORY W. MOELLER, District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
322 East Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ...................................... 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6
Jones Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In
Denying The Two Challenged Post-Conviction Claims After An
Evidentiary Hearing ................................................................................... 6
A.

Introduction ..................................................................................... 6

B.

Jones Is Precluded From Challenging The District Court’s
Lack Of Findings For The First Time On Appeal ............................. 6

C.

In The Alternative, Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief Because A
Review Of The Record Reveals An “Obvious Answer To The
Relevant Question” Of Whether He Can Satisfy The Strickland
Standard With Respect To Either Of The Challenged Claims ......... 7

D.

1.

Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That Garner
Was Ineffective For Failing To Request Funds To Perform
A Private And Confidential Psychosexual Evaluation For
Defense Review ...................................................................... 9

2.

Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That Garner
Was Ineffective For Failing To Advise Jones Of His Right
To Appeal The District Court’s Denial Of His I.C.R. 35
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence ....................................... 11

If This Court Concludes That The District Court Erred And
That Remand Is Necessary, Jones Is Not Entitled To A
New Evidentiary Hearing ............................................................... 13

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 15
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) ......................................... 8
Bedke v. Pickett Ranch and Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 137 P.3d 423 (2006) ....... 7
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1989).............................. 8
DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009) ..................................... 7
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004) ............................................ 7
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)........................................ 10
Gonzalez v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 254 P.3d 69 (Ct. App. 2011) ................... 10, 11
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 900 P.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................ 8
Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1985) ........................... 8
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014) ......................................... 11
State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 859 P.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................. 13
State v. Jones, 2014 WL 280371 (Idaho App. January 24, 2014) ..................... 2, 3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................... 7, 8, 11, 13
Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990) ........................................... 8
STATUTES
I.C. § 19-2520G .................................................................................................... 2
I.C. § 19-4907 ............................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
RULES
I.A.R. 17(e)(1)(C) .......................................................................................... 12, 13
I.C.R. 35 ...................................................................................................... passim
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) ............................................................................................... 7
ii

I.R.C.P. 52(b) ........................................................................................................ 7
I.R.C.P. 52(c) .................................................................................................... 6, 7
I.R.C.P. 59(e) ........................................................................................................ 7

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lester Laural Jones appeals from the district court’s order denying his
post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In June 2012, the Madison County Sheriff’s Office received information
that 49-year-old Lester Jones recently had a sexual relationship with 17-year-old
D.R. (#40863 R., pp.13-16.1) Detective Curtis Wood contacted D.R., who told
him that she started dating Jones when she was 16, that the relationship became
sexual, and that D.R. was the father of her six-month-old child. (#40863 R.,
p.15.) D.R. also disclosed that she broke off the relationship with Jones several
months earlier. (Id.) Detective Wood then contacted Jones, who admitted that
he had a sexual relationship with D.R. before she turned 18, and that D.R.’s child
was his. (#40863 R., pp.15-17.)

1

The district court took judicial notice of the records associated with Jones’
underlying criminal case, Madison County Case No. 2012-02108. (R., p.116 n.1,
pp.137-138; Tr., p.162, L.13 – p.163, L.23.) It also appears that Jones submitted
the clerk’s record and reporter’s transcripts associated with his direct appeal as
Exhibit E in the post-conviction proceeding (though these documents were
somehow omitted from the appellate record in this case). (See R., p.9.) The
state attached the transcripts of Jones’ change of plea and sentencing hearings
to its post-conviction petition Answer. (R., pp.40-65.) In his Appellant’s brief,
Jones indicated an intention to file a motion requesting this Court to take judicial
notice of the record from his direct appeal. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2 n.1.) It
does not appear that Jones has yet filed such a motion.
Therefore,
contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that this
Court take judicial notice of the clerk’s record and reporter’s transcripts
associated with Jones’ direct appeal, Docket No. 40863.
1

The state charged Jones with statutory rape and the I.C. § 19-2520G
repeat sex offender sentencing enhancement.2

(#40863 R., pp.26-29.)

James Archibald was appointed to represent Jones.

R.

(#40863 R., p.20.)

However, approximately four months later, and before entering into a plea
agreement with the state, Jones retained Joshua A. Garner to represent him.
(#40863 R., p.37.)
Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Jones pled guilty to statutory
rape and the state agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (#40863 Tr.,
p.5, L.15 – p.19, L.21.) The state also agreed to limit its recommendation with
respect to the fixed portion of Jones’ sentence to ten years. (Id.) The district
court ordered a psychosexual evaluation, permitted Jones to choose which of
two providers would conduct the evaluation, and notified Jones of his
constitutional right not to participate in the evaluation. (#40863 Tr., p.2, L.12 –
p.3, L.4; p.14, L.16 – p.16, L.7; p.20, Ls.1-12.)
The district court imposed a unified 30-year sentence with 10 years fixed.
(#40863 R., pp.44-45.) Jones filed a notice of appeal, timely from the judgment
of conviction. (#40863 R., pp.48-51.) Jones also filed a timely I.C.R. 35 motion
for reduction of sentence. (#40863 R., pp.46-47.) The district court denied this
motion. (#40863 R., p.53.) On direct appeal, Jones asserted that his sentence
was excessive, but did not challenge the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35
motion. See State v. Jones, 2014 WL 280371 (Idaho App. January 24, 2014)

2

The state alleged that Jones was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct in
1991. (#40863 R., p.28.)
2

(unpublished). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s sentence.
Id.
In February 2015, through counsel, Jones filed a post-conviction petition
accompanied by a supporting affidavit and other exhibits. (R., pp.6-36.) The
petition consisted of two broad categories of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims with approximately 17 total sub-claims. (R., pp.6-18.) Jones alleged that
both Archibald, Jones’ initial appointed counsel, and Garner, Jones’ retained
counsel, were ineffective. (R., pp.9-15.) Relevant to this appeal, Jones alleged
that Garner was ineffective for failing to request funds to perform a private and
confidential psychosexual evaluation for defense review, and for failing to inform
Jones of his right to appeal from the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion.
(R., pp.14-15.)
The state filed a motion for the summary dismissal of all of Jones’ postconviction claims and sub-claims. (R., pp.76-78, 110-114.) After a hearing, the
district court granted the state’s motion with respect to all of Jones’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claims regarding Archibald, but denied the motion with
respect to all of Jones’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding Garner.
(R., pp.116-122.) The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the claims
relating to Garner. (Id.)
Archibald, Garner, Jones, and Jones’ sister testified at the evidentiary
hearing.

(Tr., p.44, L.6 – p.159, L.5.) After the hearing, in a memorandum

decision, the district court denied Jones’ remaining ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.

(R., pp.158-174.) The court concluded that Jones failed to

3

establish any of his claims by a preponderance of evidence. (R., p.171.) Jones
timely appealed. (R., pp.175-179.)

4

ISSUE
Jones states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred in failing to make specific
findings of fact, and by failing to state expressly its conclusions of
law, relating to each issue presented by Mr. Jones at his evidentiary
hearing.
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Jones failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying the
two challenged post-conviction claims after an evidentiary hearing?

5

ARGUMENT
Jones Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Denying The
Two Challenged Post-Conviction Claims After An Evidentiary Hearing
A.

Introduction
Jones contends that the district court erred in denying his post-conviction

petition after an evidentiary hearing.

(See generally Appellant’s brief.)

Specifically, Jones contends that the court violated I.C. § 19-4907(a) by failing to
“make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law,” with
respect to two of his ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims: (1) that Garner,
his retained counsel, was ineffective for failing to request funds to perform a
private and confidential psychosexual evaluation for defense review, and (2) that
Garner was ineffective for failing to advise Jones of his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Id.)
Jones’ assertions fail for two reasons.

First, Jones is precluded from

challenging the district court’s lack of findings for the first time on appeal.
Second, even assuming the district court erred as alleged, reversal is not
required because a review of the record reveals an obvious answer to the
relevant question of whether Jones is entitled to relief on either of his claims.
B.

Jones Is Precluded From Challenging The District Court’s Lack Of
Findings For The First Time On Appeal
Idaho Code § 19-4907(a) directs that a district court in a post-conviction

action “shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of
law, relating to each issue presented.” However, I.R.C.P. 52(c) provides that “[n]o
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party may assign as error the lack of findings unless the party raised the issue to
the court by an appropriate motion.” See also Bedke v. Pickett Ranch and Sheep
Co., 143 Idaho 36, 41, 137 P.3d 423, 428 (2006) (“Because Pickett Ranch did not
raise to the district court the alleged lack of findings regarding Bedke’s
maintenance practices [as required by I.R.C.P. 52(c)], it cannot assign the lack of
findings on that issue as error on appeal.”). Further, it is well-established that
issues which are raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by the
appellate court. DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151
(2009); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 376, 384 (2004).
In this case, Jones failed to make use of avenues by which he could have
utilized a motion to challenge the district court’s alleged lack of findings below,
e.g., I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) (governing motions for reconsideration); I.R.C.P. 52(b)
(governing motions to amend judgments or to make additional findings); I.R.C.P.
59(e) (governing motions for relief from judgment).

Therefore, Jones is

precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal, and this Court
should affirm the district court’s order denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction
claims.
C.

In The Alternative, Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief Because A Review Of
The Record Reveals An “Obvious Answer To The Relevant Question” Of
Whether He Can Satisfy The Strickland Standard With Respect To Either
Of The Challenged Claims
As noted above, I.C. § 19-4907(a) directs that a district court in a post-

conviction action “shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its
conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.” The purpose of this

7

requirement is to afford an appellate court an adequate basis upon which to
review the district court’s decision when a petition for post-conviction relief has
been denied following an evidentiary hearing. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,
405, 775 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 1989); Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497,
700 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985). However, the absence of express findings
and conclusions may be disregarded by the appellate court where the record is
clear and yields an obvious answer to the relevant question. Maxfield, 108 Idaho
at 497, 700 P.2d at 119. “The failure of the trial court to make specific findings
and state its conclusions thus does not necessarily require reversal.”

Id.

(emphasis in original).
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must
prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart
v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in a post-conviction petition, the
petitioner must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687–688 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224
(Ct. App. 1995).

To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of

showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176

(1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would
have been different. Id. at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.
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In his post-conviction petition, among numerous other allegations, Jones
alleged that Garner was ineffective for failing to request funds to perform a
private and confidential psychosexual evaluation for defense review, and for
failing to advise Jones of his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his I.C.R.
35 motion. (R., pp.14-15.) The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing on
these and other sub-claims alleging ineffective assistance of Garner. (R., pp.116122.) The district court did not specifically reference these two sub-claims in its
memorandum decision denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction claims following
the evidentiary hearing.

(See R., pp.158-174.)

However, Jones is still not

entitled to a remand in this case because the record is clear and there is an
“obvious answer to the relevant question” of whether Jones can demonstrate he
is entitled to relief.
1.

Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That Garner Was
Ineffective For Failing To Request Funds To Perform A Private And
Confidential Psychosexual Evaluation For Defense Review

In his post-conviction petition, Jones alleged:
Mr. Garner did not request funds to have a confidential and
privileged evaluation completed for review by the defense before
deciding whether to disclose the results to the prosecutor and the
Court.
(R., p.14.)
This sub-claim was related to a broader sub-claim asserting that Garner
was ineffective with respect to the pyschosexual evaluation. Jones also alleged
that Garner was ineffective for failing to adequately explain to him his
constitutional right not to participate in the evaluation, and for ultimately choosing
an evaluator who was disfavored by Jones.
9

(R., pp.13-14.)

At the post-

conviction evidentiary hearing, Garner testified that he could not recall if he had
ever discussed with Jones the possibility of obtaining a private, confidential
evaluation, and Jones testified that he did not have any such discussions with
Garner. (Tr., p.74, Ls.21-24; p.115, Ls.12-14.)
In its memorandum decision denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction
claims, the district court concluded that Jones failed to meet his burden of
establishing that he was entitled to relief on “any of his claims.” (R., p.171.) The
court expressly analyzed Jones’ claims that Garner was ineffective for failing to
adequately explain to him his constitutional rights with respect to the evaluation,
and for choosing an evaluator whom Jones disfavored. (R., pp.166-168.) The
court did not expressly discuss the related sub-claim that Garner was ineffective
for failing to request funds for a confidential and privileged evaluation. (See Id.)
A review of the record and the applicable law reveals that the “obvious
answer to the relevant question” of whether Jones is entitled to relief on this
claim is that he is not, and therefore, no remand is necessary despite the district
court’s apparent failure to specifically address this claim.

Specifically, in

Gonzalez v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 173-174, 254 P.3d 69, 74-75 (Ct. App. 2011),
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that defense counsel’s obligation, as recognized
by Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), to advise the defendant
regarding a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation “does not extend to an
obligation to first obtain a confidential defense evaluation to inform the decision
whether to submit to a court-ordered evaluation.” Therefore, the Court held,
Gonzalez failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim and was not entitled to the

10

appointment of counsel. Id.; see also Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168-169,
321 P.3d 709, 718-719 (2014) (“Murray has not offered any authority whatsoever,
nor has this Court discovered any authority, suggesting that failing to inform a
client of their ability to seek a confidential evaluation prior to pleading guilty falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”).
Because Jones cannot demonstrate that his counsel’s failure to obtain a
confidential evaluation constituted deficient performance pursuant to Strickland,
Jones cannot show he is entitled to relief on this claim. Because the record is
clear and there is an “obvious answer to the relevant question,” this Court should
affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.
2.

Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That Garner Was
Ineffective For Failing To Advise Jones Of His Right To Appeal The
District Court’s Denial Of His I.C.R. 35 Motion For Reduction Of
Sentence

In his post-conviction petition, Jones alleged:
Finally, Mr. Garner did not inform Mr. Jones of his right to appeal
the denial of [Jones’] Rule 35 motion. Mr. Jones would have
appealed the denial of his Rule 35 motion had he known that such
an avenue was available to him.
(R., p.15.)
At the evidentiary hearing, Jones testified that he did not know he had a
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion until it was too late
to file such an appeal, and that he would have appealed had he been aware of
his right to do so. (Tr., p.120, Ls.13-24.) Jones’ sister testified that Jones’ family
was unaware that an appeal was a possibility. (Tr., p.92, Ls.19-23.) Garner
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testified that he did not recall whether he discussed a potential I.C.R. 35 appeal
with Jones. (Tr., p.77, Ls.5-17.)
At the conclusion of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the district
court referenced this claim and ordered the production of the transcript of the
I.C.R. 35 hearing. (Tr., p.160, L.15 – p.161, L.8.) However, the court did not
expressly analyze or reference the claim in its memorandum decision and order
denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction claims. (See R., pp.158-174.)
A review of the record and the applicable law reveals that the “obvious
answer to the relevant question” of whether Jones is entitled to relief on this
claim is that he is not, and therefore, no remand is necessary despite the district
court’s apparent failure to specifically address this claim.

Specifically, I.A.R.

17(e)(1)(C) provides that a notice of appeal from a judgment shall be deemed to
include “[a]ll interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the
judgment or order appealed from except orders relinquishing jurisdiction after a
period of retained jurisdiction or orders granting probation following a period of
retained jurisdiction.”
In this case, the district court entered the underlying judgment of
conviction on February 12, 2013. (#40863 R., pp.44-45.) Jones filed his I.C.R.
35 motion on March 7, 2013. (#40863 R., pp.46-47.) Jones filed a notice of
appeal from the judgment of conviction on March 22, 2013, and an amended
notice of appeal on April 23, 2013. (#40863 R., pp.48-51, 55-58.) The district
court denied Jones’ I.C.R. 35 motion on April 1, 2013.

(#40863 R., p.53.)

Therefore, pursuant to I.A.R. 17(e)(1)(C), Jones’ notice of appeal from his
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judgment of conviction was deemed to include the district court’s post-conviction
order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion. See also State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 326,
859 P.2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that, pursuant to I.A.R.
17(e)(1)(C), the district court’s denial of Fortin’s I.C.R. 35 motion was properly
before the Court of Appeals even though Fortin filed his notice of appeal from the
corresponding judgment of conviction before the district court dismissed the
I.C.R. 35 motion). Jones could have raised issues related to the denial of his
I.C.R. 35 motion in his direct appeal, but did not.

Therefore, Jones cannot

demonstrate Strickland deficiency or prejudice with respect to Garner and this
claim.
Because Jones cannot demonstrate that Garner’s alleged failure to advise
him of his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion
constituted deficient performance or resulted in prejudice pursuant to Strickland,
Jones cannot show he is entitled to relief on this claim. Because the record is
clear and there is an “obvious answer to the relevant question,” this Court should
affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.
D.

If This Court Concludes That The District Court Erred And That Remand Is
Necessary, Jones Is Not Entitled To A New Evidentiary Hearing
Jones requests that this Court vacate the district court’s post-conviction

denial order and remand the case for a new evidentiary hearing. (Appellant’s
brief, p.9.)

However, should this Court find that the district court committed

reversible error by failing to specifically address the two challenged postconviction claims, it should instead vacate the denial order and remand the case
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with instructions for the court to address each claim based upon the evidence
already submitted in the post-conviction proceeding. Jones is not entitled to a
new evidentiary hearing or a second opportunity to present evidence because he
asserts only post-hearing error with respect to these two claims.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order denying Jones’ remaining two post-conviction claims.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2017.
_/s/ Mark W. Olson________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of May, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
ERICK R. LEHTINEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender’s basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk’s office.
__/s/ Mark W. Olson_________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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